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Executive Summary 
 
In 2001, Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf instituted the Local Governance 
Ordinance, a law designed to give average people a larger role in government 
planning. Under the law, individuals were invited to create Citizen Community 
Boards (CCBs). Composed of twenty-five citizens, CCBs, in cooperation with local 
governments, have the authority to undertake development projects such as the 
construction of roads, lining of irrigation channels, and development of school 
facilities. Since the first CCBs were formed in 2003, many questions have arisen 
about their efficacy and independence. Despite millions of dollars of local 
government funds going to these boards, there has been little analysis of their 
membership and activities. 
 
This study concentrated on three aspects of CCBs: 1) Their leadership; 2) their ability 
to encourage citizen participation; 3) and their responsiveness to the needs of local 
peoples. This brief was written to provide policymakers and practionners with 
information on how CCB projects are being implemented and recommendations on 
how to make them stronger.  
 
In particular the paper addresses four policy problems impacting CCBs: 1) 
Inefficiencies in the administrative systems facilitating the boards; 2) Cooption of the 
boards by an individual or a group; 3) Legal questions about ownership of CCB 
projects; and 4) Questions of sustainability that arise in part from these ownership 
issues. 
 
The field research was conducted in five districts including Lahore City, Faisalabad, 
Hafizabad, Chiniot, District Jhang, in Punjab and Abottabad in the North West 
Frontier Province. Based on talks with policymakers and practionners, I selected these 
districts either because they had encountered problems with CCB implementation or 
because they had a reputation of developing innovative practices. In each district, I 
conducted formal interviews with civil servants, elected representatives, and CCB 
organizers and focus group sessions with community members. 
 
In theory, CCB policy should create new mechanisms of interaction between people 
and the government. However, my field research suggests there are many problems 
with their implementation. Often CCBs have difficulty in getting their projects started. 
Many CCBs do not have the capacity to submit technical proposals or cost estimates 
and must rely on consultants who can undermine their independence. In other cases, 
local officials undercut CCBs because they are seen as competitors for very limited 
federal funding. In some instances, local authorities have gone so far as to highjack 
CCBs for their own political gain. Finally, disputes over maintenance and questions of 
ownership can leave completed CCB projects in limbo.  
 
This paper suggests some solutions to these and other problems facing CCBs. To 
reduce administrative inefficiencies, the office of community development needs to be 
strengthened. There also needs to be more wide-spread awareness of CCB rules so 
that members are aware of their rights. And, to ensure that CCB projects are 
sustainable, the government must clarify issues of ownership and oversight.  
 
 3
This study represents my preliminary work on the topic of CCBs in Pakistan. I will 
produce a second paper, which will include follow-up of key districts and a broader 
sample set, later in 2006. 
 
This research was conducted under the auspices of the International Policy Fellowship 
Program of the Open Society Institute, a global foundation aimed promoting 
democratic development. 
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Introduction 
 
In 2001, the government of Pakistan promulgated the Local Governance Ordinance 
establishing three tiers of local government at the district, tehsil (municipal), and 
union council (sub-municipal) levels
1
. Since Pakistan’s independence, this is the 
fourth attempt to establish a system of local government. The three previous attempts 
failed because local government had no significant powers, there was opposition from 
the provincial assemblies, and limited opportunities for citizen participation. This 
current attempt is unique because it enables participation through the creation of 
Citizen Community Boards (CCBs). CCBs are a registered group of at least twenty-
five citizens that are formed to implement small-scale development projects at each 
tier of government. The government will provide up to eighty percent of the cost of a 
project if the CCB can raise twenty percent through philanthropy or grants. The 
allocation of this budget to non-governmental actors is unprecedented and presents a 
unique opportunity to examine policy issues emerging around the use of non-
governmental actors as service-providers. This brief examines four policy problems 
related to the implementation of Citizen Community Boards: 1) Inefficiencies in the 
administrative systems facilitating the boards; 2) Procedural inadequacies in CCB 
governance that lead to cooptation by individuals or groups of people; 3) Legal 
questions about ownership of CCB projects; and 4) Maintenance of CCB projects and 
lack of coordination within government departments. 
 
 
Policy Problems Related to the Governance of Citizen Community Boards 
(CCBs) 
 
CCBs began forming in 2003 when official guidelines were published by the National 
Reconstruction Bureau. Over the last two years, approximately 14,000 CCBs
2
 have 
been registered nationwide. However, anecdotal evidence suggests a much smaller 
number have submitted proposals or implemented projects. In Pakistan’s most 
populated province of Punjab, data collected by the Japanese International 
Cooperation Authority (JICA) show that only 37% of CCBs have submitted project 
proposals and just half of those proposals were approved. As of August 2005, some 
Rupees 8 billion in CCB grant money remained unspent
3
. 
 
The slow usage of funds suggests there are problems with the governance of CCBs. 
Part of the problem can be attributed to a lack of experience and resources. Most 
CCBs don’t have the technical ability to write infrastructure proposals that the 
government can support. The government also lacks staff and capacity for processing 
CCB registration and project proposals.  
 
                                                 
1
 A Union Council usually encompasses three or more villages. 
2
 CCB Data obtained from the Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment through personal 
communication. Please note that this figure is approximate as data on CCB registration is not 
systematically collected by the government. 
3
 CCB Data obtained from JICA through personal communication 08/05/2005. 
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There are also more fundamental structural problems within the CCB system. Most 
notably, three individuals have disproportionate influence over CCB planning, 
budgets, and projects. 
The first is the nazim, or the elected head of local government. The nazim controls the 
funds for CCBs, and in addition, he presides over the local government’s assembly, 
which is responsible for approving CCB projects. With the power devolved to them, 
the nazimeen
4
 have ample opportunity to co-opt CCBs and their projects, especially 
since many also see CCBs as undercutting their authority.  
 
The non-elected executive district officer for community development, or EDO-CD, 
also holds disproportionate power over the body. The EDO-CD’s office is responsible 
for registering and initially approving projects before they are sent to the local 
government assembly. These civil servants have a great deal of power because they 
are appointed by the provincial government and are not accountable to anyone at the 
local government level. Many of these civil servants resent CCBs because they 
increase work loads and decrease their authority over development projects. 
 
Finally, the CCB chairman also can have undue influence over the activities of the 
organization, especially since there is little awareness in most communities about the 
privileges of CCBs. 
 
A third problem facing CCBs is their uncertain legal relationship to local government. 
According to the Local Governance Ordinance (LGO), a CCB is an independent 
nonprofit that is able to maintain its own assets. However, the LGO also states that in 
case of dissolution or deregistration, any asset where the government has contributed 
funds shall be subsumed by the government. This clause has been interpreted by the 
Punjab government to mean that CCB projects must only be implemented on 
government land. This interpretation has created problems because it is hard to find 
government land that can be used. Furthermore, CCBs are reluctant to maintain assets 
seen as belonging to government. This issue needs to be clarified to ensure sustainable 
project implementation.
5
 
 
The fourth problem facing CCBs has to do with quality control and monitoring. In 
some sense, CCBs can be seen as non-governmental groups providing services 
typically under the purview of government. CCBs, for example have been involved in 
building roads, lining irrigation channels, and other forms of infrastructure 
development. But unlike government, CCBs lack formal mechanisms of 
accountability, such as elections. It is not clear whether there are necessary structures 
between the public, CCBs, and the government to ensure quality service-delivery.  
 
Utilizing primary field research, the goal of this policy brief is to provide 
recommendations to policymakers and policy practionners on how to strengthen 
policy related to CCB development. 
                                                 
4
 Plural for nazim or elected representative. 
5
 Manual of New Punjab Local Government Laws 2005. Manoor Book House. 
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Scope and Methodology of Research Project 
 
This research was carried out under the auspices of the Open Society Institute’s 
International Policy Fellowship. This project is designed to examine the character of 
leadership, quality of local participation, and issues of accountability emerging within 
CCBs. To this end, I interviewed CCB leaders and members and conducted focus 
group sessions with community members to ascertain the background of the leaders; 
to what extent they involved the community in their decision-making, and whether the 
development agenda of the CCBs matched that of the community. A list of my 
interviews is attached as Annex 1. 
 
Also, in order to gauge the level of access, I wanted to study the implementation 
processes employed by the CCBs. To do so, I first read and studied the legal 
framework governing devolution and interviewed the various agencies working with 
CCBs. I also interviewed civil servants and elected representatives at the local 
government level on CCB processes and held both formal interviews and focus group 
sessions with members of CCBs.   
 
To date, I have visited four districts in Punjab and one district in the Frontier 
Province; Lahore City, Faisalabad, Hafizabad, and Tehsil Chiniot in the Jhang District 
and Abottabad District in the Frontier Province. My site selection was made based on 
secondary reports on Citizen Community Board’s activity. The primary purpose of 
this phase of the study was to capture the kinds of CCB practices that were emerging 
and the quality of leadership. I selected districts where I had heard both positive and 
negative reports of CCB governance practices by practionners and policy researchers. 
Based on these preliminary field studies, I will further refine my interview questions 
and finalize my field sites.  
 
Local government elections were being carried out during my preliminary field visits. 
CCB activity was limited because local government was suspended in June 2005 and 
no new CCB projects were being processed. However, I was ale to look at ongoing 
CCB projects and speak to the members about their past experiences. In addition, my 
preliminary field work was interrupted in the Frontier province because of the South-
Asian earthquake, but I will be adding more Frontier sites in the second phase of the 
project. 
 
 
Key Terms of the Study 
 
This study is examining the quality of governance, level of CCB accountability, and 
the quality of participation that is promoted by CCBs. This section will define these 
key terms. Governance is defined as the method by which leaders of the organization 
engage their members and manage project activity. An organization that employs 
principles of good governance will be run in a democratic fashion where the 
stakeholders will have an opportunity to contribute to the agenda of the meeting. In 
addition, there will be defined rules of business that are equitable and transparent.  
 
Accountability is defined as the ability of the members to check the power or sanction 
the leaders. This could involve formally holding a referendum mandated in the by-
laws of the organization to sanction the elected representative or more informally 
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dropping by the chairman’s house to be appraised of the CCB’s activity. Because 
these CCB structures are fairly new, informal ways to hold leaders and government 
officials to account are more prevalent. In many cases, individuals from the same 
village are part of a greater family structure. While such structure may create an 
implicit hierarchy, it also provides informal information networks, which can be used 
to hold CCB leaders to account. This informal understanding of accountability is more 
appropriate in this stage of CCB development. 
 
Finally, participation implies interaction and association with the community 
members of the organization. Participation again more formally implies attendance at 
meetings or involvement during the implementation of a project. Tacitly, at a minimal 
level participation could also imply a level of awareness or knowledge. A longer 
discussion on these concepts will be carried out in the forthcoming research report. 
 
History of Devolution in Pakistan 
 
Pakistan has made several previous attempts at local government, with what can be 
considered, at best, mixed results. The first local government was established in 1947, 
when Pakistan attained independence. It was built upon a system established under the 
British colonial administration and organized around local councils at various levels. 
After independence, all adults were franchised to participate in the elections of these 
local governments, but the practice was short-lived: Major General Sikander Mirza 
abrogated the Constitution of 1956 and introduced Martial Law. Within twenty days 
of the inception of martial law, Army Chief General Ayub Khan took over the 
government.  
 
Khan overhauled the previous system with the Basic Democracies Order, which again 
established district councils, town committees and union councils in rural areas. 
Shortly thereafter, in 1960, a four-tier system of local government was established in 
Pakistan. However, nine years later, General Yahyah Khan, Ayub Khan’s military 
successor transferred power from local government to civil servants. 
 
At the fall of General Ayub’s regime in 1969; power was again transferred to the 
civilian government of President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. During his administration two 
versions of the local government act were created, but both failed to gain political 
traction. Bhutto’s largely ineffectual 1975 Governance Act was the last such attempt 
at local government until General Pervez Musharraf implemented the present Local 
Governance Ordinance (LGO) passed in 2001.  
 
Since 2001, President Musharraf and the National Reconstruction Bureau (NRB), the 
federal agency managing the process of devolution, have established local 
government in all 122 districts of the country. The union council nazim and naib 
nazim, his second in command, are the only two leaders who are directly elected. 
These elected Union Council or UC nazimeen form the councilors of the district 
assembly and the naib nazimeen comprise the tehsil council. One-third out of thirteen 
UC seats are also reserved for women, farmers, and other minorities. The district and 
tehsil nazimeen and naib nazimeen submit their applications to the electoral college 
and are elected by UC level representatives.
6
 
                                                 
6
 Manual of New Punjab Local Government Laws 2005. Manoor Book House. 
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Background of CCBs 
 
Citizen Community Boards were originally envisioned by the National Reconstruction 
Bureau (NRB) to improve participation at the local level. The creation of these boards 
seems to be inspired by the model of social mobilization developed by the network of 
Rural Support Programmes (RSPs). RSPs are nongovernmental actors that exist in the 
four provinces of Pakistan. They were formed by a combination of private and 
government actors in order to reduce poverty through social mobilization. This model 
was inspired by the Aga Khan Rural Support Programme piloted in the Northern 
Areas of Pakistan in 1982. RSPs mobilize networks of community organizations that 
implement various development projects including infrastructure development, health, 
and education provision.  
 
CCBs are nearly identical to the community organization established by the RSPs 
except that CCBs are registered by local government and must make their 20 percent 
contribution in cash as opposed to RSPs who accept in-kind payment as well. Any 
group of 25 people possessing national identity cards, except those who hold formal 
political offices, can register themselves as CCBs to qualify for funding for similar 
kinds of projects as implemented by the RSP community organizations. The 
government provides 80% of the funding, leaving CCBs to collect the other 20%. This 
cash contribution, according to the National Reconstruction Bureau, ensures that there 
is some community ownership.  
 
CCBs are able to receive funding from each level of government (e.g. district, tehsil, 
and union) and other private donors. The purview and scale of development activity is 
specified for each tier of government. For example, CCBs who obtain funding from 
district government can work to construct roads whereas CCBs on a tehsil or 
municipal level can request funding for lane construction. It should be noted that this 
division is not always clear. For example, when the former nazim of tehsil Garanwalla 
in Faisalabad District approved a project to build a boundary wall around a school, he 
was told by a district councilor that he was in violation of the rules because all 
education projects should be approved by the district council.
7
  
 
At present, the majority of CCBs in the districts I visited are engaged in implementing 
projects related to infrastructure development. District level projects include 
construction of major roads and development of education facilities. There are several 
public health projects also being developed including building dispensary and a 
cardiology wing of a district hospital in Pakpattan in Punjab.
8
 Tehsil level projects 
include lane pavement, waste management, sanitation and a number of agriculture 
projects mostly related to the lining of water courses. UC level projects are very small 
because of limited funding and can work in the same sectors as the district. 
 
Under the guidelines CCBs can apply for up to two projects in each calendar year; 
though in some areas such as Chiniot up to 24 projects have been awarded to CCBs in 
the same year. The selection of the project is up to the discretion of the 25 members of 
the CCB. After the CCB is registered, it submits a project to the EDO-CD’s office 
who forwards it to the relevant line department. The CCB works with the relevant line 
department official to develop the proposal, and once the concept is approved it is sent 
                                                 
7
 Interview with Abdur Rahman, former nazim of Garanwalla. 
8
 Personal conversation with chairman of Allied CCB 08/23/2005. 
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to the office of the finance officer for financial approval. In most cases, after the 
finance officer has approved it, it is sent to the district council for a vote. Though, in 
some districts it is sent to the council before it has attained approval from the finance 
department.
9
  
 
The greatest delay in this process is receiving technical approval for the project 
proposal by the relevant line department. CCBs do not have the capacity to develop 
project documents and cost estimates. Often, they must defer to agencies such as the 
RSPs or government officials. CCBs are reluctant to get project cost estimates made 
by local government officials because often they feel that the government includes 
inflated costs to collect some measure of illicit profits. In addition, the government 
and CCBs find it difficult to agree on cost estimates because government funds must 
be budgeted based on official government rates
10
. These rates are often outdated and it 
is unrealistic for CCBs to stay within the guidelines.
 11
 Often, this confusion is 
exacerbated because at times the government rates are used exclusively and at other 
times CCBs are asked to come up with their own estimates.  
 
At present, in Punjab there are no ceilings on the level of project funding. Project 
ceilings were in consideration in Lahore during the time of my visit. The suggested 
project limit for Tehsil Municipal Authority or TMA was Rs. 100,000 to Rs. 500,000, 
anything below Rs. 100,000 was a UC project and anything above 500,000 belonged 
to the district. Some district governments in the Frontier have created guidelines 
suggesting that a district level project is worth Rs. 500,000, tehsil level project worth 
Rs. 100,000, and union level projects worth Rs. 50,000. However, at this stage, these 
are only suggested guidelines and not enforceable in the province.
12
 
 
According to the official CCB guidelines, there is a three-part system for monitoring 
CCBs. Each tier of government where the CCB attains funding is meant to form a 
monitoring committee. Each relevant line department is also supposed to monitor the 
project in each stage of development and release funds when it has been completed 
satisfactorily. Furthermore, CCBs are also supposed to form internal monitoring 
committees composed of members. In many areas, monitoring is exclusively 
performed at the discretion of the line department as the committee of the local 
government lacks the time, expertise, or interest. Often times, CCB members also lack 
awareness or interest in their project creation.  
 
Actors Involved in Mobilizing Citizen Community Boards 
The role of elected officials 
 
There are four major institutional actors working with CCBs: 1) The office of the 
elected representative; 2) Relevant district line departments; 3) Devolution Trust for 
Community Empowerment, a government created nonprofit organization to support 
CCB mobilization; and 4) Other donor support organizations including the network of 
Rural Support Programmes. 
                                                 
9
 CCB Guidelines February 2002. 
10
 These are official rates that are loosely based on market rates, but often are not revised very 
frequently. 
11
 At present, local government in many districts is using rates conferred in 1999.  
12
 Personal conversation with Colonel Mustafa 09/27/2005. 
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Based on my field research, the elected representative or nazim and the Executive 
District Officer of Community Development (EDO-CD) have a high level of 
discretionary authority over the affairs of the Citizen Community Boards. The nazim 
is the head of the district council composed of union councilors. All CCB projects 
must be voted on by the council, and based on my interviews with various CCB 
members; the nazim has considerable sway over which projects are approved. 
According to an official from Hafizabad District in Punjab, district councils, which 
are meant to give final approval on CCB projects, seldom defy the will of the nazim, 
and council approval in many cases is a formality. Two members of the New Mozang 
CCB in Samnabad, Lahore District, among others also mentioned that they were able 
to get their projects approved with greater ease because of their political ties to the 
nazim. The tehsil nazim of Chiniot, Zulfikar Ali Shah, also mentioned that unless he 
personally oversees the implementation of CCB, projects do not move forward as line 
department officials at the tehsil level or tehsil municipal officers have little incentive 
to give priority to these projects.
13
 
 
In the initial days of CCB registration, several UC nazimeen created scams to register 
CCBs so that they could claim some of the government’s money. According to a 
program officer from the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), a nazim 
and some associates allegedly held a fake motorbike lottery so they could collect the 
identity cards necessary to register CCBs.
14
  
 
Incidents like the motorcycle scam are exacerbated by DTCE’s policy of providing 
funding directly to the UC level nazimeen for CCB mobilization. Officially, DTCE 
gave union councilors Rs. 40,000 for CCB mobilization. However, unofficially, the 
union nazimeen were told they would receive half the money for registering 5 CCBs 
and the other half with five more registrations. This policy led to the registration of 
fraudulent, patronage-based CCBs.
15
 At present, there is no means to verify CCBs. 
Even at the project submission level, the veracity of the membership is not 
ascertained.  
 
In many districts, the district councils have formally or informally created mandates to 
give nazimeen even greater authority over CCBs. For example, in District Abbottabad 
in the Frontier, before a CCB can register EDO-CDs require a formal letter from the 
nazim. According to the EDO-CD, this new policy ensured that the nazimeen would 
be on board with CCB projects. This unofficial policy has become standard practice in 
Abottabad and could comprise the independence of CCBs. In District Faisalabad in 
Punjab, the district council has also passed an order creating a committee composed 
of executive district officers from all the district line departments as well as the 
concerned nazim of the union council to resolve grievances against CCBs. While the 
committee does have a directly elected representative on board, the line ministries 
have much more authority than a UC nazim and could result in co-optation by an 
unelected authority. This committee is new in forming and it not clear what 
implications it has on the governance of CCBs.  
 
                                                 
13
 Interview with Tehsil nazim, Zulfikar Ali Shah 08/30/2005. 
14
 Interview with Kawakita San, JICA 08/23/2005. 
15
 Personal interviews with Shaheen Bibi (Abottabad), HELP CCB, UC 119 in Garanwalla. 
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The role of civil servants 
 
After the District Nazim, the office of the Executive District Officer for Community 
Development (EDO-CD) is the most influential in working with CCBs. The EDO-CD 
is a new post created by the Local Governance Ordinance (LGO). The LGO 
dismantled the office of the District Commissioner who was the premier administrator 
at a district level. Now, at the district level there are 10 offices under the EDO rank 
responsible for the functions of the District Commissioner. These officers are 
appointed by the provincial government and are meant to work in conjunction with 
the local nazim. However, in some cases the EDO has access to greater resources than 
the local nazim. In addition, an EDO-CD is appointed by the provincial government 
and are not accountable to the local nazim. The National Reconstruction Bureau says 
that they will soon be creating a cadre of district level civil servants under the district 
nazim to create a communication channel between the elected leaders and the civil 
servants, but there is no information on when that is going to happen. An official at 
DTCE mentioned that these district level civil servants would again be placed below 
the provincial cadre; which could create overlapping authorities undermining 
accountability
16
.  
 
These civil servants are responsible for registering, approving the projects, and 
monitoring CCBs. Registration takes place in the office of the EDO-CD at the district 
level. The centralization of registration hinders formation of the CCBs as the process 
requires many trips that are not accessible to the people living in rural areas.  
 
Registration involves filling out two copies of the CCB registration form with original 
signatures and ID cards of the 25 CCB members along with a fifty rupee fee. 
Registration is completed in two stages. At first, the CCB submits the form with a 
proposed name. Once the civil servants have ascertained there are no duplicate 
registrations, they process the paperwork. Many CCB members complained that it 
was a hassle to get the forms because the EDO-CD’s office did not have the necessary 
photocopies. Some CCBs also complained that they the government officials 
requested a small fee for processing the grant. Many individuals, especially in the 
rural areas, also do not have identity cards and it is a hassle to obtain one. 
 
The delays in forming CCBs in part have to do with the capacity of the EDO-CDs 
office. The EDO-CD’s office is a conglomeration of the departments of labor, social 
welfare, sports and culture, cooperatives, and community organizations. While the 
EDO-CD heads the all of these areas; he or she does not have any staff members that 
work exclusively on community development. The EDO-CD loans officers from the 
social and welfare department to register CCBs and there is high turnover. Lahore city 
created an independent CCB cell to register CCBs, but an NGO assisting the cell in 
Lahore city district reported that this independent cell lacked the necessary authority 
and actually exacerbated delays in the registration process.
17
 
 
The EDO-CD’s office in Faisalabad has taken a different approach, opening a one-
window operation in order to facilitate CCB projects. According to EDO-CD Shabbir 
every Tuesday and Thursday, his staff including a representative from the relevant 
line departments, are available all day to facilitate CCB registration and project 
                                                 
16
 Interview with Paul Oquist, Governance Advisor, UNDP and DTCE September 2005. 
17
 Interview with Shazia Khan of the Youth Commission on Human Rights 08/23/2005. 
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implementation. However, members of some CCBs mentioned that the officers are 
rarely present at the same day.  
 
At the tehsil level, CCB project approval is performed by the tehsil municipal 
authority, which is parallel to the district line departments. Projects submitted to the 
tehsil council are first examined by the relevant tehsil municipal officers before 
passed on to the assembly. At the UC level, there are three secretaries or paid civil 
servants who process CCB requests. However, since the entire annual budget of most 
UCs is Rs. 120,000, the projects are smaller and simpler in scale and therefore do not 
require much technical support. 
 
The role of the Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment (DTCE) 
 
The DTCE was created as an independent organization to support CCBs. In many 
ways, it can be considered the implementation arm of the National Reconstruction 
Bureau and the Federal Minister heading the NRB also is the Chairman of DTCE. 
DTCE is funded by bilateral donors including the British Department of International 
Development (DFID), Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) and the 
United Nations Development Program. In the initial days of its inception, DTCE 
worked with partner organizations in 13 pilot districts in order to train and mobilize 
CCBs. These trainings took place over three days and their sessions comprised of how 
to register and create project plans. 
 
DTCE also directly funded advocacy and project activity at the UC level and provided 
a monitoring function by conducting several studies of CCB activity. But overall, 
DTCE’s efforts for community mobilization suffered because they did not have a field 
presence and were not able to coordinate well amongst the various local actors. 
 
DTCE has also had trouble coordinating amongst the various training providers. For 
example, the National Commission on Human Development was responsible for 
training local government officials. However, DTCE did not ensure that the trainings 
of these government officials took place in concurrent districts. Furthermore, as 
discussed above DTCE’s policy of giving money directly to the nazimeen was 
problematic as it only led to registration of fraudulent organizations.  
 
The role of other organizations and agencies 
 
In addition to DTCE, there were other groups involved in the registration and 
mobilization of CCBs. As discussed above, one of the most influential players was the 
network of Rural Support Programmes. As these entities had already an existing 
network of 72,000 community organizations (COs), they had great leverage in 
mobilizing CCBs. A significant percentage of COs were formally registered as CCBs. 
RSPs conducted the trainings in seven out of the thirteen DTCE districts through their 
training department, the Institute of Rural Management.  
 
RSPs have a crucial role to play if CCBs are going to be successful given their 
extensive network of community organizations. In two districts of Frontier, Haripur 
and Charsaadda, the Sarhad Rural Support Programme (SRSP) has piloted a 
community mobilization project. In each of the districts, SRSP provided two social 
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organizers (one male and female) and provided logistical support. This arrangement 
allowed more sustainable interaction between the organizers and the CCBs. The three 
days of official training following the DTCE are not sufficient to mobilize CCBs 
given that very few villagers have had prior exposure to interacting with government. 
CCBs in these areas also formed partnerships with the union councils. For example, 
unofficially, CCB/CO members were able to participate during union council 
meetings. While, I have not formally had a chance to interview the members of these 
districts where RSPs have established longer term models of social mobilization as of 
yet, I believe the RSP model of social mobilization has resulted in the registration of 
the greatest number of sustainable organizations. 
 
RSPs have also unofficially been involved in fielding questions about CCB project 
creation. For example, in District Abottabad the EDO-CD’s office reported that the 
RSPs were responsible for assisting in developing project proposals for at least half of 
the CCB projects that were approved. Many of these projects are submitted by 
community organizations that have registered as CCBs. Unofficially, in Punjab some 
field units of the Punjab Rural Support Programme including Sialkot have also been 
involved in processing CCB applications. 
 
In addition to the RSPs, several donor agencies such as the Asian Development Bank, 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Japanese International 
Cooperation Agency (JICA) have formed devolution support programs. In many 
cases, these agencies support various capacity-building programs for local 
government. For example, they support training of local government officials or 
development of financial management systems. The JICA program is the first 
program to have completed a complete survey of the capacity of union nazimeen and 
the three secretaries that work under them. Similar to the RSP model, CIDA has also 
created a support unit in Abottabad that helps to register CCBs and work on project 
proposals.  
 
Character of CCBs 
 
There are four kinds of CCB players emerging in the districts I visited in Punjab and 
the Frontier: 1) CCBs organized by affluent philanthropists, usually businessmen; 2) 
CCBs that are organized by individuals involved in politics; 3) CCBs that were 
previously registered as NGOs; 4) CCBs that have converted from RSP community 
organizations. 
 
The most common CCBs forming in the districts where I traveled were composed of 
local philanthropists. In this kind of CCBs, there is one dominant actor who typically 
belongs to the business community and is able to personally donate a significant 
portion of the twenty percent contribution that must be made by members of the 
Citizen Community Board towards the project. In these kinds of CCBs, downward 
accountability is difficult to maintain given that one individual has a great deal of 
discretionary authority. Furthermore, this model raises questions of sustainability, 
since the projects depend almost wholly on these individuals.  
 
In some cases, the drive of one individual has led to the successful implementation of 
development projects. In Tharmoochia, a village in Abottabad District in the 
Northwest Frontier Province, Manzoor Khan, the CCB Chairman, was critical in the 
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implementation of a water project. His village had no water supply for the past 25 
years, but through the CCB system, he was able to get a pipeline from a mountain 
source. Khan was the single force behind this CCB: he registered the organization, 
contributed the 20% and helped organize construction. A member of the CCB pointed 
out that he had an income of Rs. 60,000/month because of his lands and therefore did 
not have to work
18
. 
 
While the pipeline was completed successfully, the community was not involved in 
Manzoor Khan’s project. I met with the members of the CCB and the community and 
they were not aware of what a CCB was or the fact they were listed as members. 
Many confused the CCB with another NGO. In this example, Manzoor Khan’s vision 
matched the needs of the community members. As explained by the villagers, they 
trusted Manzoor Khan (even though they were not involved) because he lived in the 
same village, and understood their development issues.
 19
 
 
But in other cases, the CCB Chairman effectively co-opted his board. For example, 
the chairman of Green’s Housing Society (who I was not able to interview), a housing 
development under construction, formed a CCB to build a north-circular road in 
Lahore District worth Rs. 64 million
20
. According to documents provided by the CCB 
cell in Lahore, the Green’s Housing Society CCB’s membership was made up nearly 
exclusively of local developers. These contractors had a clear conflict of interest 
because they stood to profit from the road’s construction, and this makes the lack of 
local representation deeply troubling. 
 
In both examples, participation of the community was low and the success of the 
project depends on the intentions of the leader. In the case of Tharmoochia, Manzoor 
Khan successfully represented his community; however the road built by the chairman 
of the Green’s Housing Society appears to be self-serving. In this kind of CCB there 
is a high likelihood that accountability is compromised.  
 
In other instances, elected leaders, especially nazimeen, form CCBs for their own 
political agenda. Again, in this kind of CCB, participation of community members is 
limited and accountability is also severely compromised. As mentioned above, early 
in the process of mobilization, DTCE provided incentives to UC nazimeen to register 
CCBs. Many of the CCBs resulting from this campaign were registered by the family 
of the nazim. According to my interviews, this discredited CCBs in the eyes of many 
community members. 
 
Aside from the districts where DTCE operated, many nazimeen were against CCBs, 
which they saw as under-cutting their own authority. Given that the nazimeen could 
not ignore CCBs altogether, many also registered family members or business 
associates. These CCBs served to strengthen the political patronage networks of the 
nazim. In many cases, they became active only during election season when votes had 
to be garnered.   
 
In Samnabad, a neighborhood in Lahore District, I toured lanes paved by the New 
Mozang CCBs. The two leaders of this CCB were sons of local entrepreneurs 
                                                 
18
 Interviews with Manzoor Khan, 09/26/2005 and CCB members 09/27/2005. 
19
 Interview with members of the CCB 09/27/2 
20
 Data obtained from CCB cell, Lahore District. 
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politically backed by the local nazim. The projects they supported were not in their 
own union council as stipulated in the guidelines, but in the neighboring union 
council, perhaps as a way to gain a political foothold there. In this particular example, 
there was minimal awareness by the community members on the activities of the 
CCB.
21
  
 
In Hafizabad in Punjab, the activities of the local CCB also helped to strengthen the 
patronage networks of the Bhatti family. The Bhatti family is a land-owning family in 
this District and the CCB had paved a road running between two fields. I sat on this 
road for some time and all of the passersby attributed the construction of the road to 
the Bhatti family as opposed to the CCB.
22
 
 
A third kind of CCB that is emerging is composed of existing professional nonprofit 
organizations that are registering as CCBs to gain another funding source. These 
CCBs operate as user committees, and they are only active for the lifespan of a 
project. These organizations usually have an existing governance and board structure, 
an office space, permanent volunteer or salaried staff, and multiple projects. HELP or 
Health, Education, Literacy Project is such an organization. It was formed by a group 
of concerned citizens in Lahore District to improve the neighborhood’s schools and 
health providers. The president of HELP registered the organization as a CCB in order 
to access funds to open a computer lab in one of the neighborhood schools. However, 
this proved to be difficult because none of the public schools had the necessary space 
to build a computer lab. Eight months later, HELP managed to get a plan approved 
from the district council (after allegedly paying Rs. 5000 to the relevant district 
officer for education to draw up implementation plans). They also collected their 
requisite 20%; however, 18 months later they have yet to receive the matching project 
funds because the government cannot agree on the vendor.
23
  
 
The Girl Guides Association, an organization that provides activities for young girls 
in Pakistan, has also registered as a CCB in order to raise money for a volunteer 
center. They too had not received any funding as of yet because it was difficult to find 
property that was owned by the government. In both of these cases, the NGOs 
registered as CCBs in order to gain access to additional funds for a particular project; 
however, the organizational infrastructure is pre-existing. Accountability of the 
project depends on the preexisting organizational infrastructure. In the case of HELP, 
the members were also the community members and seemed to be engaged. The 
membership of the Girl Guides was composed of volunteers and had no real links to 
the community they were serving. When I asked why they had submitted a proposal 
for a vocational center, they said it was because that is what they knew how to do as 
opposed to having a genuine desire from the community. 
 
A fourth kind of CCB consists of RSP community organizations (COs) that have 
registered as CCBs. These include women’s and men’s organizations as well as the 
network of RSP support. In some areas, there is a formal agreement between DTCE, 
CCBs, and RSPs. In other areas, this relationship is not formal, but because there is an 
existing relationship between the community organization and the RSP, RSP staff 
assist in project preparation as well. For example, in District Abottabad, the RSP has 
                                                 
21
 Observation 08/21/2005. 
22
 Observation 08/20/2005 
23
 Interview with members of HELP 08/23/2005. 
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assisted in preparing almost half of the proposals submitted by the CCBs. In this case, 
the community organization has become a CCB in order to access project funding. It 
is therefore necessary to ensure accountability mechanisms exist to ensure that one 
CO is not simply co-opting the benefits of the project. For example, in Abottabad I 
saw a road pavement project that was organized by a community organization 
president; however, the road seemed to be benefiting only five people.  
 
The problems of accountability of COs that are converted to CCBs are very similar to 
the other cases discussed above. In many cases, the chairman of the COs are the most 
active member. In cases where there are existing links with the community, there is 
downward accountability. In other areas where the community is not as involved, 
accountability is compromised. Because COs are informal bodies and there are no 
formal mechanisms to ensure participation and accountability, the quality of 
governance varies widely. 
 
COs who have converted to CCBs in many ways also resemble user committees. That 
is, these organizations form for a specific development project, but they do have 
enough social infrastructure to develop more general development or arbitration roles. 
 
In general, the RSP converted COs by far have been the most promising because they 
have been exposed to a decade or more of social mobilization. The success of CCBs 
depends on a commitment to long-term mobilization and if this model is to survive 
the government needs to partner with organizations with a field presence. 
 
Trends in Participation 
 
The quality and method of participation are as varied as the character of CCBs. The 
kind of CCBs that have been the most successful at mobilizing their constituents are 
the CCBs that have pre-existing social structures and networks. For example, the 
HELP CCB, which strove to build a computer lab in its public schools, represents a 
solid mode of participation judging from the number of participants that were invited 
to our meeting and how much each of them participated. We were also told that HELP 
has regular meetings on a quarterly basis. While it was not possible to verify whether 
the members had regular meetings, they did all live within the same mohallah, or 
community, and had many informal exchanges. A community member’s right to 
participate was also written up formally in their by-laws. In this case, the fact that 
HELP was located in the same place as its target beneficiaries and the fact that the 
rights of the members were constitutionally protected provides some measure of 
accountability. 
 
At the other extreme, the organizations such as the one run by Manzoor Khan in 
Tharmoochia and two CCBs in Faisalabad working on water issues, participation is 
less widespread. Most members are not aware of what a CCB is and frequently 
confuse CCBs with the RSP community organization and other NGOs.  
 
As mentioned above, most of the participation takes place between the organizer of 
the CCB, one or two individuals, and the city officials responsible for managing CCB 
funds. In a best-case scenario there are informal links between preexisting NGOs or 
community or familial ties. In those cases, there is informal interaction between the 
 17
CCB organizers, their members, and the wider community. However, mostly those 
links are not in place and there is no participation. 
 
Given the lack of general awareness, it is very easy for CCBs to be coopted by one 
individual or a group of individuals. In the best of circumstances, the needs of the 
people match the vision of the individual or the money is co-opted to serve a few 
people. However, in both the scenarios, individuals are not engaged in decisions that 
affect their lives. The community members simply become recipients of services as 
opposed to proactive stakeholders. 
 
Given Pakistan’s power hierarchy, it is not surprising that political families are taking 
advantage of the CCB system to maintain existing social relationships. However, the 
implementation and legislation of CCBs must strengthen the role of community 
members to ensure that the various CCB project schemes match their development 
needs.  
 
Implementation of CCB Projects 
 
Two years after the promulgation of the Local Governance Ordinance, there is not 
much evidence of CCBs shaping the village landscape. There has been some 
infrastructure development on a small scale such as water pumps, creation of links 
roads, and lining of irrigation channels.  
 
At present, however, the rules of CCB business are exceedingly complicated, 
primarily because there is no exclusive department that deals with registration, CCB 
project approval, monitoring, and disbursement. As mentioned above, the Executive 
District Officer for Community Development’s office is responsible for registering 
and providing support to CCB. However, his office is short-staffed and has no staff 
with technical skills. According to a District Deputy Officer for Social Welfare in 
Lahore, the process takes seven days; however, according to CCB members it take up 
to several months especially for the CCBs coming in from the rural areas. Delays are 
caused by a lack of information as well as lack of administrative systems in place.  
 
CCB Capacity 
 
CCBs have the greatest difficulty with project proposal design. Successfully fulfilling 
a CCB scheme requires a level of technical sophistication that the CCBs do not 
possess. The project proposals generally require some technical knowledge including 
some engineering and financial training. At present, CCB members are now reliant on 
people with more technical information. In all of my interviews, project proposals 
were prepared by independent consultants, RSPs, or another CCB support program. 
CCB project approval supports people who are able to submit an acceptable proposal 
as opposed to where there is need.  
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Purview of CCB projects 
 
Because CCBs are a new concept and the rules of business were only finalized two 
years ago, many of the smaller districts lack information on how to implement CCB 
projects. First, there is some controversy in regards to what is an acceptable 
development project. In Hafizabad, according to the DCO who is the highest ranking 
civil servant on a district level, there was a debate in the district council in the last 
term whether a janaz-gah, a shelter for funeral ceremonies on a burial ground, was an 
appropriate project for a CCB. According to the DCO, they were not suitable because 
they did not constitute a development activity. However, while CCBs are intended to 
improve the development of a village; there is nothing in the law that limits the 
projects to conventional development objectives. The National Reconstruction Bureau 
in consultation with existing Citizen Community Boards needs to provide clarity on 
the purview of CCB activities. Certainly, these issues should not be left open under 
the purview of an individual civil servant. 
 
There is also some confusion about which activity belongs to which line department. 
For example, in Garanwalla, the tehsil nazim had approved a CCB project, which 
built a boundary wall around a school. However, he was told that because the 
boundary wall was around a government owned school, and the project came under 
the district’s education line department and he did not have the jurisdiction to approve 
it. He felt he was justified given that the project was not of a technical nature. The 
NRB needs to distinguish between functional and substantive projects. In this 
particular case, the former nazim’s claim that he should have jurisdiction over 
functional projects seems to be justified. 
 
In addition, the health projects are devolved to the district level. However, the office 
of the Public Health and Education Department has not been devolved to the district 
level from the provincial government. At this stage it is not clear who has the 
authority to approve and monitor these projects. 
Ownership of CCB projects 
 
Examples from Punjab also suggest several questions related to the ownership and 
maintenance of the CCB projects. According to the law, CCBs and their members 
have ownership over the projects and they are responsible for maintaining them. 
However, in Punjab, the district government has decreed that the projects must be 
built on government land because they are largely funded by the government. This is 
inhibiting the development of some CCB activity in Punjab because the boards are not 
able to acquire the necessary government property. For example, the Girl Guide CCB 
in Lahore had proposed to build a vocational center for women; however, they were 
not able to use private land and had difficulty in acquiring government property.  
 
Partially out of frustration over this policy, CCBs have begun turning over the 
responsibility of maintaining the larger projects to government. Form 4, which is used 
to approve CCB project has a box CCBs can tick absolving them of any responsibility 
of maintenance. This is clearly not a sustainable solution. It undermines the notion of 
community ownership, and in addition, puts the future of CCB projects in the hands 
of government officials whose budgets are already threadbare. Turning the projects 
over to government will only result in their failure.  
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The issue of maintenance of the future CCB projects is tied to ownership. If the 
projects are a government asset, there is little incentive for community members to 
maintain the resource. Without prolonged investment, the CCB project are reduced to 
user committees. However, because a CCB project is not part of the regular portfolio 
of the various district departments, the project’s maintenance becomes difficult to 
coordinate. 
 
Coordination with government 
 
Closely related issue to issues of ownership is the coordination between CCBs and the 
myriad of government departments and authorities responsible for them. For example, 
in Samnabad, the CCB had paved inner city lanes; however, the lanes had no drains 
and caused flooding during the monsoons. The CCB members explained they had not 
built drains because they were the responsibility of the Water and Sanitation 
Department. When I asked what would happen if the Water and Sanitation 
Department ripped the lanes to insert drains, they mentioned that was not the purview 
of the CCB and WASA would be responsible for repairing the lanes. Given the 
complexity of maintaining public infrastructure and the level of coordination 
necessary between various departments, the government needs to revise the purview 
of CCB activities to match their capacity. 
 
CCB Success Stories 
 
While CCBs have had a slow start there have been some successful practices that are 
emerging. As mentioned above, CCBs have put in place a mechanisms for interaction 
between the government and the citizens. Earlier where there was interaction only 
during election time, CCBs ensure that community members engage government all 
year round. In the Chiniot tehsil of district Jhang, there has been great buy-in from the 
Nazim Zulfikar Ali Shah. He has made 35% of the government’s budget available to 
CCBs as opposed to 25% available everywhere else. His tehsil has also successfully 
completed 64 projects including a significant sanitation project. 
 
CCBs are also becoming a vehicle for interesting collaboration between civil society 
actors and government. For example, in District Abottabad, a Member of the National 
Assembly was so impressed by the efficiency of a local CCB that he transferred his 
development budget directly to the CCB. This transfer could potentially facilitate 
greater links between provincial and local government. 
 
In many villages, projects completed through CCBs are the first evidence of 
government funds in over 25 years. While there has been a great deal of corruption, in 
some instances CCBs have ensured that funds are released to the village level. In the 
case of Tharmoochia, water was brought into the village after 25 years. This positive 
experience could galvanize further interest within CCBs perhaps improving 
accountability in the future. 
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Recommendations for Policy-Makers 
Administrative processes 
 
• Registration should be implemented on a tehsil level. The processes of 
registration must be streamlined. The current registration processes serve as a 
disincentive for CCB formation. At present, CCBs are only able to register at 
the district level, which is inaccessible for many people. Often they have to 
pay travel fares that are unaffordable for them and forgo their daily wages. 
Registration at the tehsil level will make the processes more accessible. The 
tehsil level also has the necessary infrastructure to process a registration.  
 
• Communication between CCBs and line ministries especially dealing with 
monitoring should be written down. At present the monitoring of CCB 
projects is performed on an ad hoc basis. Members of several line departments 
have mentioned there is no written communication between the line ministries 
and the CCBs. Instituting a written process will ensure greater accountability 
and clearer communication between line ministries and CCBs.  
 
• The EDO-CDs office needs permanent and technical staff. At present, 
delays are caused in CCB registration and project processing because the 
EDO-CD’s office is short-staffed. The practice of transferring staff on a short-
term basis further muddies the lines of responsibility. Hiring permanent staff 
will ensure greater administrative efficiency and it will be easier to hold the 
staff accountable.  
 
Improving accountability 
 
• The local government councils should have a CCB committee. At present, 
CCBs do not have a body to turn to when there are problems with project 
implementation. Often times they appeal to the NRB or DTCE both of whom 
do not have the field presence or mandate. If there was a genuine problem with 
CCB implementation, it could be addressed by a committee of representatives 
at the appropriate council level. These members could be given training so that 
they are clear on CCB rules of procedure. 
 
• DTCE needs to create follow-up trainings in the districts making sure to 
include a wider subsection of the community to improve accountability. 
As mentioned above, very few individuals are informed of what a CCB is and 
how it works. In order for there to be wider spread participation and 
awareness, there need to be more awareness campaigns. These campaigns 
need to be informal in nature so that they do not alienate people. If DTCE 
works through social mobilizers, they can establish village wide information 
sessions and focus groups.  
 
• CCB rules of business need to ensure that CCB participation and 
mechanisms of interaction are specified in the organization’s by-laws. 
Given that the character of various NGOs differs, the CCB rules of business 
need to ensure there is some mechanism of interaction between community 
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members and CCBs. These mechanisms can include written reports to the 
government as well as a monitoring committee of citizens, which is mandated 
but not implemented. 
 
Ownership of CCB projects 
 
• The government needs to revise rules of business in order to clarify who 
has ownership of CCB projects. This clarification should address who owns 
CCB projects and when government funds can be utilized on private land. In 
cases where government funds are used on private land, the rules of business 
need to specify what will happen to the asset in case of dissolution of CCB. In 
cases where projects are built on private land, the rules need to specify the 
process of approving the use of the land. 
 
Purview of CCB projects 
 
• The government needs to revise rules of business regarding maintenance. 
The rules of business need to address under what conditions, the government 
will assume maintenance of CCB assets. In the case where government takes 
over projects, it must make clear who will assume responsibility for the 
upkeep. 
 
• The purview of the various tiers of government over approving CCB 
projects needs to be clarified. In the case described of tehsil Garanwalla, the 
nazim approved of a project to rebuild a school boundary wall even though 
education is under the district council. Tehsil governments should be allowed 
to deal with education projects with the project is functional in nature. 
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Annex 1: List of Interviews 
 
Interviews with Local Government Support Programmes 
 
Interviewee Organization/Title 
Naveed Saleh Asian Development Bank, Senior Program Officer 
Mohd. Tariq Founder of Sabawon, CIDA and JICA consultant 
Kawakita San 
Japanese International Cooperation Agency, Senior Program 
Officer 
Haseeb Athar and the DSP CIDA team 
Canadian International Development Association, Senior 
Programme Officer 
Farooq Haroon Director of Punjab Rural Support Programme, Chairman 
Khizer Gondal Pakistan Department of Municipal Finance, Chairman 
Iomamoto San Asian Development Bank, Program Officer 
Naem-ul Haq National Reconstruction Bureau, Chairman 
Zafar Malik Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment, Acting CEO 
Zulfikar Ahmed, Abdul Ghafar Khan National Commission for Human Development 
Daniyal Aziz  National Reconstruction Bureau, Chairman 
Doug Porter  Asian Development Bank, Senior Governance Advisor 
Karam Ellahi Institute of Rural Management 
Rumi Hayat Institute of Rural Management, CEO 
Shoaib Sultan Khan Rural Support Programme Network, Chairman 
Mosharraf Zaidi 
Department for International Development, Governance 
Advisor 
Nigat Nisa Department for International Development, Program Officer 
Aalya Goelkar Department for International Development 
 
 
Interviews with Nazims 
 
Name Location 
Col. Ahmad Ali, District Nazim Hafizabad 
Abdur Rahman, Tehsil Nazim Garanwala 
Zulfikar Ali Shah, Tehsil Nazim Chiniot 
Col. Mustafa , District Nazim Abottabad 
Shaukat Haroon, UC Nazim Abottabad 
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Table of Interviews with Civil Servants 
 
Name/Position Location Posted 
Pervaiz Sahib, DO Social Welfare  Lahore district (retiring) 
Asma Bibi, DDO Social Welfare Lahore 
Mian Waheed, DO Finance Lahore 
Javed Latif, Additional Secretary Local Government Punjab 
AS Bhatti, Secretary Livestock Lahore 
Abid Saeed, Additional Secretary Education Lahore 
Iftekar Hussain Shah, DCO Hafizabad 
Choudhary Sarfraz, EDO CD Faisalabad  
Auranzeb Abassi, EDO CD Abottabad 
Mr. Zia-ud-din, TOI Infrastructure Abottabad 
Sardar Abdul Qayyum, Tehsil Municipal Officer Abottabad 
Sardar Naeem, Office Superintendent, Planning Office Abottabad 
 
 
Table of Interviews with CCBs 
 
Name Location 
Ijaz and Fahim   Samnabad, UC 106  
Girl Guide CCB  Lahore 
Health Education Literacy CCB Lahore 
Organizer of the Allied Community Board   Lahore 
UC 119—interview with members of the school Faisalabad 
(CCB 115 Garanwalla 
Manzoor Khan, CCB Chairman Tharmoochia Abottabad 
Himat or Sitara CCB Abottabad 
Shaheen Bibi, CCB  Abottabad 
Mohammad ArshadMirpur CCB CCB Chairman UC Mirpur, Bagha village, Mirpur 
Rashida Begum CCB Mirpur Mirpur Abottabad 
Meeting with Tarmoochia CCB Tharmoochia 
Riaz Basti-lal Khan CCB Basti Lal Khan 
 
 
Interview with NGOs involved with CCBs 
 
Name/date Organization 
Shazia Khan YCHR 
Nazir Ahmed Wattoo Behbood Association 
Khatib Alam and Nadir and Tariq  DFID Project 
Fauzia Bibi CESSED (Canadian International Development Agency) 
Asrar Ahmed Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Project 
 
 
 
